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ABSTRACT
This paper integrates and cuts through domains of privacy law and biometrics. Specifically, this
paper presents a legal analysis on the use of Automated Facial Recognition Systems (the AFRS) in
commercial (retail store) settings within the European Union data protection framework. The AFRS
is a typical instance of biometric technologies, where a distributed system of dozens of low-cost
cameras uses psychological states, sociodemographic characteristics, and identity recognition
algorithms on thousands of passers-by and customers. Current use cases and theoretical possibilities
are discussed due to the technology’s potential of becoming a substantial privacy issue. First, this
paper introduces the AFRS and EU data protection law. This is followed by an analysis of European
Data protection law and its application in relation to the use of the AFRS, including requirements
concerning data quality and legitimate processing of personal data, which, finally, leads to an
overview of measures that traders can take to comply with data protection law, including by means
of information, consent, and anonymization. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Information society and its constellation of associated
technologies, including search engines, social media
and e-commerce shops, in particular, has spurred a
massive production and processing of personal data
that can be used for marketing purposes. Nanotech-
nologies introduce new ways of collecting and extract-
ing personal data and provide examples of how the in-
formation society is gradually bleeding over into the
physical world. This paper explores the possibilities
in and legal implications of non-invasive and portable
technologies that can detect and analyze faces to de-
termine emotions and other biophysiological parame-
ters. The purpose is to examine EU data protection
law in this context to provide guidelines for compli-
ance when using automated facial recognition systems
(the “AFRS”) in retail stores. For further information,
the researchers encourage readers to watch this brief
video: youtu.be/IUtRl8HO7Vg (AdMobilize, 2015).
The AFRS has traditionally been deployed in high-
security facilities like airports (Buckley & Hunter,
2011; Olsen, 2002), but today it is increasingly being
used in shopping malls and similar consumer settings
(Buckley et al., 2011; Singer, 2014). For example, a
recent UK survey of 150 senior IT, marketing, or digi-
tal retail executives found that almost 75% of the re-
tailers used some technology to track consumers in
the store, while 27% specifically used the AFRS (CSC,
2015). News reports include stories of large, multina-
tional producers cooperating with supermarket chains
to identify and target consumers who would be more
likely to purchase their products (Buckley&Hart, 2011; Q3
Hill, 2011; Wadhwa, 2012).
For many years, the face and fingerprints have been
relied upon as a source of biometric data, and it is
now recognized that in addition to determining iden-
tity, facial recognition can be used to establish “phys-
iological and psychological characteristics such as eth-
nic origin, emotion, and well-being” (Opinion 3/2012 on
developments in biometric technologies (WP 193), p.
21).
The development of the digital market deepened an
imbalance in the relationship(s) between traders and
consumers, leading to new questions as to the ethi-
cal boundaries of marketing and retailing (De George,
2001; Introna, 2005; Palmer, 2005). In this respect,
scholars focus either on analyzing ethical consequences
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of tracking internet users’ behavior online and which
systems allow for collection and further processing of
personal data (Charters, 2002;Miyazaki, 2008; Palmer,
2005), or on the infringements of privacy in the of-
fline world resulting from the use of digital technol-
ogy like video surveillance (Atrey et al., 2013; Senior,
2009; Wright & Kreissl, 2015). The use of the AFRS
by retailers may fall into both of these categories. On
the one hand, consumer privacy may be infringed by
the AFRS tracking consumer behavior offline. On the
other hand, this software would also enable retailers
to gather and process consumers’ personal data online,
due to its emotion and face recognition functions, which
are embedded into distributed systems that generate
big data processed “in the cloud.” These practices may
infringe upon a person’s right to his own image, which
is protected as part of the right to privacy under Article
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (2010,
amended) as ruled in Sciacca v. Italy (no. 50774/99, § 29,
ECHR 2005-I) (Buckley et al., 2011). Moreover, these
practices may equally be contrary to the system estab-
lished by the EU data protection law, unless traders
using the AFRS take some precautionary steps to pre-
vent this infringement (Buckley et al., 2011), as will be
discussed below.
The controversies and compliance questions that
arise from the use of the AFRS in retail stores is the
main subject of this paper, owing to its impact on con-
sumers and the protection of their privacy. In this re-
spect, the research aims to identify the future applica-
tions of the AFRS, together with the identification of
which types of data are necessary to achieve a given
purpose. Conceivably, not all uses of the AFRS would
lead to infringement of the EU data protection law
(Buckley et al., 2011).
First, the following sections will present the AFRS
and explore its various uses for retailers. Nextwill be an
introduction to the EU framework for data protection in
the context of consumer privacy and an illustration of
how the AFRS may impose on consumer privacy. In the
last part, the researchers suggest guidelines for the use
of the AFRS and compliance with EU data protection
law, which adds perspectives as to the future of the
AFRS, including consequences of the newGeneral Data
Protection Regulation. The core of the paper shows how
the data protection law can be applied to the field of the
AFRS, in particular, whether the AFRS can be used
to process personal data without the subject’s consent
and kinds of measures that traders may use to ensure
compliance with the law.
THE AFRS IN RETAIL
Continuous and unobtrusive measurement of both con-
sumers’ emotions and their attention simultaneously
on the shelves and the store in general could give retail-
ers additional insights into their customers’ decision-
making process (Lewinski, Fransen, & Tan, 2014).
The literature has already established that objective
emotion responses can be captured using the AFRS
with near-human accuracy rates (88% average recog-
nition rate; Lewinski, den Uyl, & Butler, 2014) or
even better than humans under some circumstances
(Lewinski, 2015a). This is important, because while
mobile eye-tracking glasses have so far proven use-
ful for measuring how consumer attention is captured
(Bulling & Gellersen, 2010), until recently nothing sim-
ilar has existed for facial tracking (unless obtrusive
head-mounted cameras were used; Dickie, Vertegaal,
Sohn, & Cheng, 2005). Researchers and retailers may
capture facial expressions through ordinary industrial
CCTV, but due to the camera’s location, and hence low
image quality, measurements via this system are not
ideal.
A practical example would be a monitoring system
installed in a retail store such that a couple approach-
ing a shelf of moderately priced bottles of wine can be
observed. They stand there for two minutes and look
at each other, and back at the shopping shelves. With
eye-tracking software, a viewer could only infer that
the couple was looking at the bottles on the shelf—but
do they like what they see? This can only be inferred if
emotional responses can be measured. The AFRS can
achieve that step by showing the couple smile, frown,
raise their eyebrows or otherwise display emotion. Will
the couple buy the retailer’s wine? On the basis of the
couple’s facial expressions when looking at a particu-
lar shelf, certain inferences may be drawn as to their
emotional responses to the products displayed there.
This may allow a retailer to predict their attitude to-
wards the product (e.g., Lewinski et al., 2014) and more
precisely, whether they might be inclined to watch it
longer (Lewinski, 2015b) or buy it (e.g., Lewinski, Tan,
Fransen, Czarna, & Butler, 2016). Such information on
the consumer’s decision-making process is valuable to
the retailer and makes the use of the AFRS attractive
to retailers.
A clothing store presents another theoretical sce-
nario demonstrating the application of the AFRS. First,
a new client named Elizabeth registers herself with the
software. The next time she walks into the shop, the
software identifies her as Elizabeth, 35 years old, who
has purchased products three times in this store in the
last two months. It tracks her around the store, regis-
ters at which racks with designer-label clothes she has
lingered, and which items she has picked for closer in-
spection. The AFRS not only observes this scene, but
it learns about her attitude towards the things she has
paid attention to by analyzing her facial expressions of
interest, happiness, or disgust through a cloud-based
AFRS module (e.g., FaceReader Online, 2015). It esti-
mates changes in heart rate through the remote PPG
(photoplethysmography) module (rPPG is a camera-
based heart rate detection; Tasli, Gudi, & den Uyl, Oc-
tober 2014). This leads to the “Circumplex Model of Va-
lence and Arousal” (Russell, 1980; FaceReader, 2015),
which helps to create a personalized, emotional profile
of the shopper for this specific store and type of clothing.
The system networkmay then notify the digital signage
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system—a digital screen that displays various adver-
tisement content, such as digital images and video in
public spaces—about the fashion items Elizabeth had
expressed interest in, allowing it to provide personal-
ized digital content to Elizabeth during her online and
offline shopping trips.
Retailers may be quite keen on moving toward test-
ing and using the AFRS in their stores. For example,
Noldus IT (Noldus, 2015), in collaboration with i3B
(2015a), already has “Shop Lab” (2015b) in place. The
Shop Lab consists of a rack of shelves with supermarket
products equipped with a specialized camera-tracking
system. The shelves aremonitored by EagleEye 3D (Ea-
glevision, 2015) camera units and Ubisense (2015) sen-
sors from above (to track consumer movements) and
Axis (2015) cameras from the side (to view close-range
behavior). They also have Tobi (2015) eye-tracking cal-
ibration points. Technically, it would be easy to moveQ4
on to the next step in their design and mount a few
miniature cameras in racks facing outward to experi-
ment with facial expression capture of a person inspect-
ing products on a shelf. Equipping such strategically
placed and customized sets of cameras with a cloud-
based AFRS (e.g., FaceReader Online, 2015) would al-
low for a thorough facial emotion analysis. However, as
will be pointed out in the following sections, compliance
with the data protection law must be ensured.
The AFRS may be designed as an off-the-shelf ap-
plication of a mobile system for human observation,
produced at low prices (less than $200) and high vol-
ume (see e.g., CNET, 2015 for a review of 35 such
cameras). Consequently, the AFRS could be perceived
as an innovative fusion between advanced human ob-
servation software and fast, energy-efficient and cost-
efficient hardware. Moreover, the advantages of the
AFRS extend beyond merely large retail chains. Ad-
ditional feasible applications include health care, secu-
rity businesses, and private use (e.g., Buckley et al.,
2011; Silver, Goodman, Knoll, & Isakov, 2004). For this
software–hardware integration to be successful, effec-
tive and efficient, the system needs to guarantee de-
sired speed, performance and reliability (for a descrip-
tion of an ineffective AFRS, see Stanley & Steinhardt,
2002). These three key indicators of commercial success
could only be achieved if the AFRS system can rely on
powerful, energy-efficient processing units that provide
the required stability for such a mobile and embedded
system.
If retailers are able to guarantee the stability of
the system, they could benefit from the AFRS in many
ways. Currently, the most promisingmarket within the
retail domain is digital signage. These screens can be
equipped with the AFRS to collect information about
the people looking at the screen. Furthermore, as has
previously been pointed out, data gathered by the AFRS
in other settings (like the inside of a shop) can then be
employed by the digital signage system. This means
that information appearing on screens would depend
on a shopper’s facial expressions of emotion, age, and
gender that have previously been recorded by the AFRS
and subsequently retrieved by it. There are a few com-
panies that offer software solutions for digital signage
already: Quividi (2015) provides measures of age and
gender; Intel (2015) provides age, gender, and view-
ing times; IMRSV (2015) provides age, gender, viewing
times, and emotions; AdMobilize (2015) provides age,
gender, viewing times, six basic emotions, and people
counting; VicarVision B.V. (2016) provides age, gender,
viewing times, six basic facial emotions, people count-
ing, heart rate detection, face features detection (facial
hair, glasses), and ethnicity.
Apart from digital signage, the AFRS can also be
used to collect consumer information in more general
retail settings, such as people counting purposes; visitor
movement and attraction patterns, which influence the
layout of products in a shop; personalization of an in-
store online ecommerce shop of a given brand tailored to
an individual customer; and even safety and care (e.g.,
aggression detection, fall detection, deceit detection).
Preliminary tests of using the AFRS in a digital signage
environment are already underway (see Figure 1 for an
illustration).
The AFRS can be used for tracking and profiling
even if there is no knowledge of the real-world identity
of an individual. It is thus possible to “track routes
and habits of individual shoppers” for the purpose of
effective queue management, product placement, and
targeted advertising or other specific services (Opinion
3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies (WP
193), p. 23).
In the next section, an analysis of the legal implica-
tions of theAFRSunder EUdata protection law in three
specific use cases will be presented. The AFRS for retail
applications can essentially be used to perform recog-
nition of (in increasing order of privacy intrusion): (a)
psychological states (basic emotions, arousal/valence,
heart beat rate, head orientation, gaze direction), (b) so-
ciodemographic characteristic/traits (e.g., gender, age,
ethnicity, facial hair, glasses) and (c) identity.
The common step for all those applications is face de-
tection (e.g., by Viola & Jones, 2004; cascaded classifier
algorithm), feature extraction, and then normalization.
Importantly, anAFRS in principledoes not require stor-
ing/acquiring an actual image/video for (a) and (b), but
does need to store such data for (c). The AFRS can work
in a “hot mode” without actually storing anything, i.e.,
using only random access memory (RAM) instead of
hard disk memory. A parallel would be a photo camera
that can detect and mark faces (or even smiles) on its
liquid crystal display (LCD) in real time.
Most AFRS detect emotions, attention, and different
psychological states (a) by face modeling (e.g., using Ac-
tive Appearance Model, Cootes & Taylor, 2000) in order
to extract features, and then some form of compression
is used (e.g., Principal Component Analysis; Jackson,
1991) to reduce the dimensionality (i.e., normalization).
Finally, the AFRS classifies the psychological states of
a person by comparing how an individual’s specific ex-
pression deviates from a baseline computed from tens of
thousands of examples of manually annotated images
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Figure 1. An example of a virtual shopping assistant in a commercial center in the Netherlands with a mounted AFRS on top of
it. The position of the AFRS is marked with a red rectangle. Reproduced with permission.
(e.g., such as ones in Olszanowski et al., 2015) using an
artificial neural network (Bishop, 1995). A similar pro-
cess is applied to the estimation of sociodemographic
characteristics (b).
Facial, i.e., identity recognition (c) is conceptualized
into the following steps: (1) image acquisition; (2) face
detection; (3) normalization; (4) feature extraction; (5)
enrollment; (6) comparison (Park et al., 2014). Thus,Q5
the image or video is acquired, then the face(s) are de-
tected and normalized, as with previous applications.
Afterwards, the facial features are extracted and stored
for later comparison. Knowing the identity allows the
trader to link the observations to information from
other sources such as online behavior. This vein is not
further pursued in this context, as this paper focuses
on activities within the physical store.
In the shopping context, the retailer may use any
of the above-reviewed applications of the AFRS for one
or both of two main purposes: understanding behavior
and influencing behavior. The AFRS can be used, in
an increasing degree of complexity and personal data
needed, for (1) testing advertisements and store lay-
out effectiveness, (2) creating varying degrees of mar-
ket segmentation, and (3) interacting with customers
in real time.
Beyond the retail context, the AFRS can be
used for many purposes, including access verifica-
tion/authentication (e.g., at the airport), suspectmatch-
ing (e.g., by police), or automatic person tagging (e.g.,
social media). That being said, the current examination
will only be concerned with applications for commercial
purposes in a physical store.
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While retailers can use an AFRS that allows for not
only facial recognition (recognizing a person), but also
emotion recognition (recognizing the emotional state
of a person from observing facial expressions), there
are fundamental differences between these software op-
tions and their impacts on consumer privacy. Different
settings of the AFRS provide a different type of informa-
tion on consumers, and hence the AFRS may enable re-
tailers the recognition of consumers’ identity, emotion
and/or sociodemographic characteristics. As mentioned
in the previous section, not all this information could
be considered as providing retailers with consumers’
personal data. Privacy issues are likely to arise when—
possibly unwanted, unexpected and not consented to—
observations of a person, in a more or less perma-
nent registration system, are connected to a personal
identity. In other words, the system knows: “You were
there, at that time, doing this.” As explained, this would
allow for the possibility of identifying the consumer,
which would lead to the classification of this software
as processing personal data. While the first function of
the AFRS, which enables recognition of the consumer’s
identity, clearly qualifies as processing personal data,
the other function, namely recognizing consumer emo-
tions and sociodemographic characteristics, cannot
necessarily be traced to an identifiable consumer.
Furthermore, facial recognition, i.e., specifically
identifying a person, is not necessarily as important
to retailers as the possibility of segmenting consumers
based on their emotions and sociodemographic charac-
teristics. The issue with the taxonomy for the AFRS is
that facial recognition (vs. emotion and/or sociodemo-
graphic recognition) is not very insightful for retailers.
Previously in this paper, a scenario with “Elizabeth”
was presented where she first registers and then later
is recognized by her name via the AFRS. However, in
reality, retailers are not necessarily interested in iden-
tity recognition capabilities in the sense of knowingwho
a person is with precision. While it is true that bet-
ter segmentation of the market could be achieved by
not counting the same person more than once, it still
would be enough for a retailer to know which sociode-
mographic groups (i.e., segments) tend to re-visit the
store. Considering the privacy issues, exact identifica-
tion of individuals seems more relevant in the security
domain, such as access control or suspect matching,
rather than in connection with the commercial/retail
use of the AFRS.
PROTECTION OF PERSONAL DATA IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION
The protection of personal data is a fundamental right
in the European Union (See Article 8 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2012) and
Joined Cases C-92/09 and C-93/09, Volker und Markus
Schecke). However, the European and national legisla-Q6
tors allow traders to gather and process personal data
provided that (according to Article 8(2) of the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights) “such data [are] processed
fairly for specified purposes and on the basis of the
consent of the person concerned or some other legiti-
mate basis laid down by law” [emphasis added]. This
entails that data protection law must be interpreted
in the light of the fundamental rights and that any
processing of personal data is a potential interference
with fundamental freedoms (Joined Cases C 465/00, C
138/01 and C 139/01, O¨sterreichischer Rundfunk and
Others, paragraph 68, and Joined Cases C-293/12 and
C-594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger et al.).
The fundamental rights to privacy and personal data
are granted to individuals in their capacity of being cit-
izens, which also includes the role of being a consumer
as dealt with in this paper.
The Data Protection Directive (1995) (hereafter “the
Directive”) lays down common rules for the processing
of personal data in the EU (see in general Trzaskowski,
Savin, Lundqvist, & Lindskoug, 2015, chapter 3). The
regulations provided in the Directive amount to harmo-
nization that is generally complete—even though the
Directive provides theMember States with amargin for
maneuver in certain areas (Case C-101/01, Lindquist,
paragraphs 96–98). The use of facial recognition may
be subject to additional regulation or control in various
Member States, including by means of prior authoriza-
tion (Opinion 02/2012 on facial recognition in online
and mobile services (WP 192), p. 5).
Pursuant to Article 29 of the Directive, the European
Commission and supervisory authorities in the area of
privacy enforcement established an “Article 29Working
Party” whose opinions, despite no binding force, play
a significant role in suggesting interpretations of the
provisions of the Directive in the absence of case law.
To some extent, these opinions are used in this context,
with proper precautions, as to the likely outcome of
decisions from the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU).
The Directive applies to any operation or set of oper-
ations that are performed upon personal data, such as
“collection, recording, organization, storage, adaptation
or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure
by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making
available, alignment or combination, blocking, erasure
or destruction” (processing) of any information relat-
ing to an identified or identifiable natural person (per-
sonal data) (Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 4/2007
on the concept of personal data and the Directive’s def-
initions). Due to the broad scope of application, it is
virtually impossible to use the AFRS without process-
ing personal data, as the mere monitoring by means of
video surveillance (e.g., CCTV) already amounts to pro-
cessing of personal data (see e.g. Case C-212/13, Rynes
v. Urad pro ochranu osobnich udaju).
Consumers need not to be identified by the AFRS in
order for the use to be qualified as processing personal
data, but there rather needs to be a possibility that this
software would enable consumer’s identification (e.g.,
see Shi, Samala, & Marx, 2006). In this respect, it is
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important to consider (a) for what purposes the AFRS
is and could be used, (b) what the cost of piecing to-
gether consumer’s identification would be (if feasible
at all), (c) what safety mechanisms have been adopted
by the controller to protect against data breaches, and
(d) what the interests of consumers are (Trzaskowski
et al., 2015). By recording central physiological features
of consumers that make facial recognition possible, the
AFRS could facilitate the identification of consumers
and, therefore, EU data protection law applies. Nev-
ertheless, as of 2015 identification from physiological
features to facial/identity recognition is far from per-
fect (e.g., see Chen, Xu, Zhang, & Chen, 2015; Stanley
et al., 2002).
DATA QUALITY AND JUSTIFICATION OF
DATA PROCESSING
A retailer may collect personal data, according to Arti-
cle 6(1)(b) of the Directive, only for specified, explicit,
and legitimate purposes. This requirement is particu-
larly relevant, as the purpose is an important yardstick
for determining whether personal data is being law-
fully processed. Thus the purpose is used to determine
whether personal data is “adequate, relevant, and not
excessive” and “accurate,” as well as not kept “longer
than necessary.” A retailer may not process personal
data further (than collection) in a way incompatible
with this purpose. The focus on “collection” in Article
6(1)(b) entails that the retailer must specify any pur-
poses prior to, and in any event not later than, the time
when the collection of personal data occurs. However,
not all instances of future processing are foreseeable
at the time of collection. The compatibility of further
processing of the collected data may, according to the
Article 29 Working Party, be determined by consider-
ing: (1) the relationship between the purposes for which
the retailer has collected data, and the purposes of fur-
ther processing, (2) the context in which the retailer
has collected data and the reasonable expectations of
the data subjects as to its further use, (3) the nature
of the data and the impact of the further processing on
the data subjects, and (4) the safeguards applied by the
controller to ensure fair processing and to prevent any
undue impact on the data subjects (Article 29 Working
Party, Opinion 03/2013 on purpose limitation (WP 203),
p. 43).
The retailer must sufficiently define the purpose of
data collection to delimit the scope of data processing
and to enable necessary safeguards. “A purpose that
is vague or general, such as “improving users’ expe-
rience,’ “marketing purposes,” “IT-security purposes”
or “future research” will—depending on the particular
context—usually not be perceived as sufficiently spe-
cific (Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 03/2013 on
purpose limitation (WP 203), p. 16). In addition, the
purpose must be unambiguous and clearly revealed,
explained, or expressed in some intelligible form with
a view to ensure transparency. However, the trans-
parency standards have not been further harmonized
(see also: Luzak, 2013; Luzak, 2014).
In the context of this paper, the focus is on data col-
lection for commercial purposes in retail. The purpose
of increasing profits by, among other things, improv-
ing customer experiences based on the use of personal
data (and thus encouraging them to shop more often)
is generally recognized as a legitimate purpose. Never-
theless, this purpose is comparatively less compelling
than, for instance, processing of personal data for crime
prevention or prosecution. Moreover, the scope of this
paper concerns facial recognition, which falls within the
scope of biometrics, and the use thereof has a high po-
tential impact on personal privacy and could facilitate
infringements of the right to data protection of indi-
viduals (Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric
technologies (WP 193), p. 3). The use of biometric data
by means of facial recognition raises issues of propor-
tionality, whichmust be assessed in light of the purpose
behind the processing—bearing in mind that the “data
may only be used if adequate, relevant, and not exces-
sive.” This implies “a strict assessment of the necessity
and proportionality of the processed data and if the in-
tended purpose could be achieved in a less intrusive
way” (Ibid, p. 8).
In addition to compliance with the fundamental
requirements discussed above, the processing of per-
sonal data must also be legitimate, i.e., justified under
Articles 7 and/or 8 of the Directive, which concern
normal data and sensitive data, respectively. Sensitive
data are data revealing/concerning racial or ethnic
origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical
beliefs, trade-union membership, health, or sex life.
Article 8 supplements Article 7, as the intention is to
provide a better protection for sensitive data. Thus, a
data processor should take both provisions into account
when sensitive data are to be processed. Even though
the expression “data concerning health” must be
given a wide interpretation (Case C-101/01, Lindquist,
paragraph 50), it is not likely to comprise facial
expressions, as long as the intention is not to extract
data concerning the health of individuals. Therefore,
the justification for processing data in the context
of the AFRS must be found in Article 7 concerning
“normal data.” However, it should be emphasized that
processing of biometric data can “be used to determine
sensitive data, in particular those with visual cues
such as race, ethnic group or perhaps a medical con-
dition” (Opinion 3/2012 on developments in biometric
technologies (WP 193), p. 23; Buckley et al., 2011).
Two of the six legal bases from Article 7 of the Direc-
tive that can justify the processing of normal data may
be relevant in this context: (a) “the data subject has
unambiguously given his consent”; and (f) “processing
is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate inter-
ests pursued by the controller [ . . . ] except where such
interests are overridden by the interests” or fundamen-
tal rights and freedoms of the data subject (Buckley
et al., 2011). The latter option entails a “balancing test”
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and may, to some extent, be used to process personal
data without the data subject’s consent. Basically, the
two options may be perceived as models for opt-in and
opt-out application of the AFRS to consumer transac-
tions, respectively. It should be emphasized that the
balancing test is not reserved for exceptional cases and
it may be used in certain instances “as a legitimate ba-
sis for processing personal data for conventional direct
marketing and other forms of marketing or advertis-
ing” (Article 29 Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the
Notion of legitimate interests of the data controller un-
der Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (WP217), pp 24–25).
Nonetheless, there are variations in the application of
the balancing test in Member States (Opinion 06/2014
on the notion of legitimate interests of the data con-
troller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (WP 217),
p. 5). The section below is a brief illustration of the re-
quirements for the balancing test. The first legal basis
of obtaining consumers’ consent to processing of their
personal data is further discussed in the following sec-
tion, as it constitutes an important measure that retail-
ers may take to legitimize their use of the AFRS.
The Balancing Test
The balancing test requires a careful examination of
the context and the circumstances concerning data col-
lection and further processing, including the trader’s
legitimate interests and the potential interference with
the data subject’s interests and fundamental rights. Ac-
cording to the Article 29 Working Party, the balancing
test may include consideration of the following factors:
“(1) the nature and source of the legitimate inter-
est and whether the data processing is necessary
for the exercise of a fundamental right, is other-
wise in the public interest, or benefits from recog-
nition in the community concerned; (2) the impact
on data subjects and their reasonable expectations
about what will happen to their data, as well as
the nature of the data and how they are processed;
and (3) additional safeguards which could limit un-
due impact on the data subject, such as data mini-
mization, privacy-enhancing technologies; increased
transparency, general and unconditional right to
opt-out, and data portability” (Opinion 06/2014 on
the notion of legitimate interests of the data con-
troller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (WP
217), p. 3; see also Trzaskowski et al., pp. 92–94).
The trader’s “interest” is closely related to, but dis-
tinct from, the concept of “purpose” discussed above.
To begin with, it must be emphasized that the trader’s
interest in increasing profits (the pursuit of economic
interests) is legitimate, and it may cover conventional
direct marketing and other forms of marketing or ad-
vertisement; however, a trader’s economic interest to
learn as much as possible about consumers to develop
better-targeted advertising is not very pressing for so-
ciety as a whole (Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of
legitimate interests of the data controller under Article
7 of Directive 95/46/EC (WP 217), pp. 24–25).
All relevant interests of the data subject should be
taken into account in the balancing test. These inter-
ests may range from serious to trivial (Article 29 Work-
ing Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate
interests of the data controller under Article 7 of Di-
rective 95/46/EC (WP217), p. 30). Several elements can
be useful to consider, including “the nature of personal
data, the way the information is being processed, the
reasonable expectations of the data subjects and the
status of the controller and data subject” (Ibid, p. 36).
The impact on the data subject comprises any possible
consequences of the data processing, as the more sen-
sitive the information involved, the more consequences
there may be for the data subject (Ibid, p. 39).
The purpose of the balancing test is not to prevent
any negative impact on the data subject, but to avoid
“disproportionate impact” (Ibid, p. 41). In order to mit-
igate the impact, the trader may provide “an easily
workable and accessible mechanism to ensure an un-
conditional possibility for data subjects to opt-out of the
processing” (Ibid, p. 41). To the extent the interest pur-
sued by the trader is not convincing, the interests and
rights of the data subject are less likely to be overrid-
den by the legitimate—but less substantial—interests
of the trader (Ibid, p. 26). Since the retailer’s legitimate
interest in the use of the AFRS to sell more products
is not particularly compelling, the balancing test may
only be used for justification of data processing that is
an insignificant intrusion of the data subject’s privacy
and does not have any other undue impact.
Given the data subject’s interest in not being moni-
tored, the balancing test does not seem to be the proper
legal basis for using theAFRS (see alsoOpinion 06/2014
on the notion of legitimate interests of the data con-
troller under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC (WP 217),
p. 46). Previously, in the context of the use of bio-
metrics for ensuring the general security of property
and individuals, the legitimate interests to ensure such
security did not override the data subject’s interests
or fundamental rights and freedoms (Opinion 3/2012
on developments in biometric technologies (WP 193),
p. 13).
MEASURES TO LIMIT THE IMPACT ON
THE DATA SUBJECTS
From the analysis above, it seems clear that obtain-
ing consumers’ consent is the most obvious solution for
justifying the processing of personal data by means of
the AFRS in the retail sector. The following paragraphs
will illustrate the effects of information, consent, and
anonymization on privacy protection and the use of
the AFRS, including whether and to what extent im-
plementation of such measures may provide sufficient
counterweight to justify the processing of personal data
without consent.
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Information on Data Processing and its
Transparency
The Directive provides the data subject with certain
rights in Articles 10, 11, 13, and 14. Pursuant to Article
10 of the Directive, the data controller (the retailer, in
case of the AFRS)must at least provide the data subject
with the following information:
“(a) the identity of the controller and of his repre-
sentative, if any; (b) the purposes of the processing
for which the data is intended; (c) any further in-
formation such as (1) the recipients or categories
of recipients of the data, (2) whether replies to the
questions are obligatory or voluntary, as well as the
possible consequences of failure to reply, or (3) the
existence of the right of access to and the right to
rectify the data concerning him in so far as such fur-
ther information is necessary, having regard to the
specific circumstances in which the data is collected,
to guarantee fair processing in respect of the data
subject.”
Since consumers are generally perceived as the
weaker party, who suffer from information deficits and
biases preventing them from making rational choices,
the European legislator has opted to restore some of
the balance in the transaction by placing such infor-
mation obligations on the data controller, in this case
the retailer. Generally, with regard to privacy concerns,
many studies have confirmed that consumers are un-
aware both of the fact that their data is being gath-
ered and processed, and for what purposes this oc-
curs (Milne & Culnan, 2004; Nowak & Phelps, 1995;
IMCO, 2011). Therefore, for information obligations to
be effective, such information does not only need to
reach consumers, but also needs to be accessible to
them (Luzak, 2013; Luzak, 2014). Without transpar-
ent provision of information on these practices, con-
sumers could not provide a valid consent to the collec-
tion and processing of their data (Opinion 2/2010 on
online behavioral advertising (WP 171), p. 17). There-
fore, only compliance with this first requirement by a
retailer—to provide transparent and comprehensive in-
formation to consumers on data processing—could lead
to the fulfillment of the second requirement, i.e., obtain-
ing a valid consent for such practices (Helberger et al.,
2013; Luzak, 2014). The information must be providedQ7
directly to the individuals, and “it is not enough for
information to be “available” somewhere” (Article 29
Working Party’s Opinion 15/2011 on the definition of
consent (WP 187), p. 20).
Thus, prior to giving their consent to the use of the
AFRS by a retailer, consumers should be well-informed
that the retailer uses the AFRS and for what purposes
their data will be used. Since the AFRS, in principle,
can be installed on any camera, it is important to con-
sider how the use of different surveillance measures
might impact consumers and their perception of the
technology. Given the ability of retailers to install the
AFRS on existing surveillance systems, consumersmay
lack clarity regarding the purpose of the camera record-
ing system. They could be unaware of the merger of
commercial and security functions in the AFRS, se-
curity being the purpose behind the original surveil-
lance system. As such, a distinction should be made
between already existing, nearly ubiquitous CCTV
cameras, which are used for security and surveillance,
and dedicated recording systems, installed with the
main purpose of gathering customers’ data for commer-
cial purposes. In both scenarios, an informed consent
could only be perceived as such if the large retailer
clearly indicated to consumers that the surveillance
system is used for commercial purposes related to the
registration and processing of not only their physical
appearance, but also of their emotional responses. Nor-
mally, the data subject must be able to foresee to what
ends the data recorded in a public place will be used
(see, e.g. Peck v. the United Kingdom, no. 44647/98,
§§ 60–63, ECHR 2003-I). However, in the first case,
the information should be more explicit and clearly
dissuade any misleading notions consumers may have
about their image being registered for security purposes
only.
Large retailers may install the AFRS equipped with
different processing protocols. On the one hand, the
AFRS could simply gather consumer data through the
original video input file, analyze it immediately in the
cloud, and—without storing the data—draw actionable
conclusions before deleting the original data. On the
other hand, the original video file could be stored for fu-
ture reference. Traders will not be able to release them-
selves from the information obligations as provided by
Article 10 of the Directive by claiming that they use
cloud services (or any other data processor) and do not
store consumers’ personal data. Under both circum-
stances, if the gathered data allowed for the identifi-
cation of a consumer, it should be considered as per-
sonal data, and the trader would be seen as processing
it, even if the data were not stored. Therefore, as ap-
pealing as this argument could be for commercial enti-
ties to claim that they do not store any personal data,
it would not mean that they do not process it. Thus,
arguably the only value that can be derived from cloud-
based processing protocols (i.e., immediate destruction
of the input video) is diminishing potential traceability
of the person (which could lead to the retailer attempt-
ing to claim that the data was anonymized – see fur-
ther below) and thus avoid a potential breach of data
(e.g., through hacking, as there would be nothing to
hack). Additionally, in the second scenario, chances for
fair and legitimate use of personal data by the data
controller are lower, since he may himself lose control
of customers’ personal data if, for instance, he allows
it to be exported to a third party. Moreover, with re-
gard to obtaining consumers’ informed consent, a re-
tailer might find it difficult to provide consumers with
sufficient information as to what purposes their data
may be used for in the future and by which parties. A
consent granted by consumers without them knowing
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what will happen to their data could hardly be seen as
informed (Luzak, 2014). The European Court of Justice
ruled that even transferring personal data from the na-
tional tax authority to the national health insurance
authority without informing the data subject does not
comply with the Directive (C-201/14, Smaranda Bara
et al. v. Presedintele Casei Nationale de Asigurari de
Sanatate (CNAS), et al.). The following paragraph dis-
cusses the validity of obtaining consumers’ consent to
the processing of their personal data.
Informed Consent
Asmentioned previously, the most reliable way to legit-
imize the processing of personal data would be for re-
tailers to obtain an informed consent, within the mean-
ing of Article 7(1)(a) of the Directive, in the context of
the use of the AFRS (see e.g., Trzaskowski et al., pp. 95–
98). Also, the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2012) in
its Article 8 para 2 specifies that personal data may
be processed, among other things, on the basis of the
consent of “the person concerned.” Of course, merely
by informing consumers about the data collection and
purposes for which it will be processed, the retailer
would not be able to freely dispose of this data. The
general standards for data collection and processing, as
discussed above, e.g., of a legitimate purpose and fair-
ness, remain applicable (see Section I—Principles Re-
lating to Data Quality, Article 6, of Directive 95/46/EC).
However, consumer protection would still increase if
the fact that such activities may occur and informa-
tion about the scope of these activities were provided to
consumers.
The data subject’s consent is defined in article
2(1)(h) as “any freely given specific and informed
indication of his wishes by which the data subject
signifies his agreement to personal data relating to
him being processed.” Due to the flexible structure
of the Directive, the nature of the personal data and
processing involved is likely to influence the threshold
for a freely given, specific, and informed consent. For
consent to be unambiguous, which is the requirement
for obtaining consent for processing normal data, the
procedure to consent must leave no doubt as to the data
subject’s intentions, which compels the data controllers
to create robust procedures for individuals to deliver
their consent. Thus, the data controller should create
and retain verifiable evidence showing that consent
was actually given (Article 29 Working Party’s Opinion
15/2011 on the definition of consent (WP 187), p. 21).
Therefore, consumers may consent to the process-
ing of their personal data, surrendering their right to
privacy (Luzak, 2013). However, this consent, in or-
der to be valid, has to be (a) unambiguous, (b) freely
given, (c) specific, and (d) informed, pursuant to Article
2 (h) of the Data Protection Directive (1995). These re-
quirements rule out the appropriateness of a consent in
blanco, without the data controller specifying for what
purposes the personal data will be processed, as well
Figure 2. An example of warning/implicit consent message.
Google Images, labeled for reuse.
as of a consent given without the consumer obtaining
other relevant and transparent information.
Since consentmay not be coerced, the question arises
as to whether the inability to conclude a contract with
the trader without having consented—in this case, by
not being able to enter a store without consenting to
the use of the AFRS—which would be a similar sanc-
tion to the one applied by website providers blocking
access to a given website if a consumer does not accept
cookies, could amount to economic duress. Consumers
should be able to grant, but more importantly, to also
refuse consent to data processing without having been
excluded from participation in the market (Helberger
et al., 2013; Luzak, 2014). In practice, even if consumers
theoretically could be seen as being able to refuse grant-
ing consent to data collection and processing, the dras-
tic consequences of consent refusal could leave them
helpless to do so. The choice to grant a consent may,
therefore, not be a real choice at all (see also Article 29
Data Protection Working Party, 2011, p. 9).
Aside from consumers not having a real opportu-
nity to say “no” to large retailers, it is still disputed
in the scholarship how they may say “yes.” That is to
say, to what extent consumers’ consent could be implied
(Luzak, 2013). For normal, not sensitive, data, the con-
sent does not have to be explicit but rather (only) un-
ambiguous. This means that if it is evident from the
consumer’s behavior that he has agreed to the data col-
lection and processing, e.g., when a consumer enters
a shop with a big and obvious sign out front that the
AFRS is being used, the retailer could potentially imply
such consent (see Figure 2 below for an example of using
such a construction with regard to CCTV surveillance).
However, the burden of proof that consent was obtained
rests on the retailer, which should motivate retailers to
actively pursue consumers and to obtain such consent
in writing. In addition, as a commercial setting is usu-
ally judged as public, not personal, space, the retailers
cannot argue that video recording is done outside of the
public space. For example, the CJEU ruled that even
video surveillance of one’s house and surrounding that
also records an adjacent road (which constitutes public
space already) requires consent of the data subjects to
process such data (C-212/13,Rynes v. Urad pro ochranu
osobnich udaju).
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Figure 3. A digital signage panel installed at Amsterdam Central Station. On the left side is a standard advertising billboard,
which is simply a TV screen and shows varying video advertisements (that is why on the left image there is a blue-colored
advertisement and on the right side a red-colored advertisement even though it is the same advertising billboard). On the right
side, it is a zoom-in picture of an Xbox Kinect sensor, with an assumed function of tracking the passersby (i.e., with AFRS
capabilities). Xbox Kinect sensor is marked with a red rectangle. Picture taken: April 2015 by the first author.
Figure 4. Real-life user interaction with a virtual shopping assistant in a commercial center in the Netherlands. It is a standard
TV screen with an Xbox Kinect (with AFRS) installed on top of it. In figure, the AFRS is marked with a red rectangle. The avatar
is able to recognize that in front of it stands (a) a man and (b) that he is wearing a pair of glasses. The avatar greets the person
with the text visible above. Reproduced with permission.
The AFRS can be used for many objectives, but it
seems that so far it has only been used to either gather
and later analyze biometrical data of passers-by (as in
digital signage, see Figure 3) or to provide tailored, in-
teractive, and real-time communication. In the second
example, a person’s biometrical data are used to re-
act appropriately to consumers’ responses, e.g., when a
person looks surprised, the system could ask: “Why are
you surprised?” (for an example, see Figure 4). A large
retailer acting as a data controller can effortlessly ask
for an informed consent from the consumer, when the
purpose of data collection is an interaction with the
system in real time, because currently people have to
stand in front of the system to interact with it. In ad-
dition, scholars could argue that if a consumer chooses
to engage with such a system that would qualify as
an informed consent. In particular, the assumption of
informed consent would be more robust if the system
began by introducing itself and explaining the purposes
for which it is being used, such as data collection and
processing.
The situation looks different in the case of digital
retail signage. In this scenario, the AFRS is often hid-
den and not instantly visible to passers-by. Therefore,
it is difficult to suggest how retailers may appropriately
obtain informed consent.
It is obvious that consent can be given orally to a
computer or by unambiguous gestures that can be rec-
ognized. For the consent to be informed, the consumer
must be aware of the fact that (1) there is a CCTV
system in operation and (2) it is used for facial recog-
nition purposes. Even though the Article 29 Working
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Party has emphasized that consent “cannot be derived
from the general user’s acceptance of the overall terms
and conditions of the underlying service unless the pri-
mary aim of the service is expected to involve facial
recognition” (Opinion 3/2012 on developments in bio-
metric technologies (WP 193), p. 22), it is possible to
obtain consent in connection with another interaction
with the consumer, such as in the context of enrollment
in a loyalty program, as long as the above-mentioned
requirements are satisfied.
Anonymizing Data
Thorough anonymization of data may help retailers
lawfully use the AFRS, as it significantly minimizes
the impact on consumers’ privacy. Specifically, data
anonymization may (a) render the data protection law
inapplicable, (b) help in the balancing test (minimiz-
ing the impact on the data subject), and (c) be a
requirement under data minimization.
Recital 26 of the Directive provides that the princi-
ples of protection do not apply to data rendered anony-
mous, as the data subject is no longer identifiable. In
order to “determine whether a person is identifiable,
account should be taken of all the means likely reason-
ably to be used either by the controller or by any other
person to identify the said person.” However, it follows
from the definition of personal data that “an identifi-
able person is one who can be identified, directly or in-
directly, in particular by reference to an identification
number or to one or more factors specific to his physi-
cal, physiological, mental, economic, cultural, or social
identity” [emphasis added]. It is thus sufficient informa-
tion to constitute personal data when “identifiers” are
used to single someone out and identify the behavior
and personality of that individual to attribute certain
decisions to him. This includes categorizing individuals
on the basis of socioeconomic, psychological, philosophi-
cal, or other criteria. (Article 29WorkingParty, Opinion
4/2007 on the concept of personal data). For example,
the absence of a first and last name in a publication
does not protect an individual’s anonymity sufficiently
(as ruled in T-259/03, Nikolaou v. Commission).
Anonymization consists of data processing that may
be justified under Article 7(1)(f) (balancing test); but
the data subject’s interest in protecting his privacy—
including his rights to rectification, erasure, blocking
objection, and to bring legal proceedings—should also
be taken into account (see Case C-553/07, College van
burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v M. E. E.
Rijkeboer, paragraph 64). Provided that sufficient in-
formation has been given to the data subject, it can-
not be ruled out that the use of AFRS can be justi-
fied under the balancing test to the extent that data is
immediately anonymized.
According to the Article 29 Working Party, it is
clear “that the creation of a truly anonymous dataset
from a rich set of personal data [ . . . ] is not a simple
proposition,” as a dataset considered to be anonymous
may “be combined with another dataset in such a way
that one or more individuals can be identified” (Opin-
ion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques (WP216), p.
5). As per this opinion, the robustness of anonymizing
techniques is based on three criteria: “(1) is it still pos-
sible to single out an individual, (2) is it still possible
to link records relating to an individual, and (3) can in-
formation be inferred concerning an individual?” (Ibid,
p. 3). Furthermore, “an important factor is that the
processing must be irreversible. Thus the outcome of
anonymization should be as permanent as erasure, i.e.,
making it impossible to process personal data” (Ibid,
p. 6). If those criteria are not fully met, this results
in a pseudonymization of the data, which may allow
for identifiability, and hence still be inside the data
protection law scope.
Enabling recognition of consumer identity, which is
generally regarded as the least important function of
the AFRS, clearly qualifies as processing personal data.
On the other hand, usages focused on recognizing con-
sumer emotions and sociodemographic characteristics
may not necessarily allow for the identification of con-
sumers. Processing such data by an advanced sensor
system should not be perceived as processing personal
data, and thus not amount to a substantial privacy is-
sue, unless this data could be linked to a specific indi-
vidual and would, therefore, allow for his identification.
That is to say, in terms spelled out in Article 29 Data
Protection Working Party, such “biometric” templates
should (a) “not be too large so as to avoid the risks of
biometric data reconstruction” and (b) “be a one-way
process, in that it should not be possible to regener-
ate the raw biometric data from the template” (Opinion
3/2012 on developments in biometric technologies (WP
193), p. 4). The pertinent question is whether it is pos-
sible to identify a consumer based on his pattern of
emotions (e.g., first smiles, then is surprised and then
smiles again). The same question may also be posed
with regard to any unique sociodemographic data that
is collected and processed (e.g., female, 35–40 years old,
Caucasian).
Therefore, anonymization is one possible solution,
provided it is (1) done well and (2) has a range of x%
probability of specifically identifying a person based
on “n” anonymized unique data points. For example,
an anonymization of three unique data points vs. six
unique data points could give, respectively, a range
of 40–60% or 50–70% of probability of indirectly re-
identifying a person. Empirical testing will be required
(possibly in each case—see the section on the balancing
test above). For example, de Montjoye, Radaelli, and
Singh (2015) discovered that 90% of individuals could
have been re-identified based only on four spatiotempo-
ral points of their credit card metadata. The empirical
question to be tested is: howmany data points extracted
from psychological states and sociodemographic traits
of an individual are enough to identify the individual
reliably?
In principle, consumer identification could oc-
cur through the collection and processing of certain
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sociodemographic data, but not of emotions. There are
infinitelymore combinations of emotional temporal pat-
tern responses (e.g., people can make up to 10,000 dis-
tinct combinations of facial movements at any given
point; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1997) than combinations
of demographic data, which would render the identi-
fication process unfeasible. As such, the gathering of
sociodemographic data should be classified as poten-
tially allowing the processing of personal data (i.e., re-
identifying the person), but registering emotions should
probably be taken out of this equation.
Another crucial factor in this analysis is whether
the gathered type of data is logged (e.g., written in
the file for later retrieval) with or without a unique
identifier (ID number for each person). If logged data
are anonymized (see an example of this in Figure 5),
and it is impossible to restore the original data that
could lead to the identification of particular customers,
then, as mentioned, the issue does not involve personal
data whatsoever. However, if the logged data is not
anonymized—in other words, some or all persons re-
ceive a unique ID number—and the gathered data al-
lows for the identification of consumers, then the large
retailer gathers “personal data” in the sense of the
Directive.
In order to be sure that even within anonymized
data, consumers cannot be re-identified by any method,
the data controller could log only aggregated data with-
out raw files (see an example of this in Figure 6). This
would hinder potential commercial insights but would
increase data protection. Large retailers may not find
this tradeoff attractive, because the purpose of their
data collection is clearly to generate as much commer-
cial value as possible. Those two approaches would
fit into “privacy-by-design” frameworks if they were
hard coded into the AFRS (e.g., Langheinrich, 2001;
Schaar, 2010). Further, as Article 29 Working Party
(2014) states in their “Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisa-
tion Techniques,” such anonymized data are no longer
considered personal data and, hence, does not fall under
the Directive.
The evaluation of the role that the AFRS could have
in identifying consumers also depends on whether it
allows not only for the processing of data in real time
but also for storing this data. If the latter is true, it be-
comes important who has access to this data and how
well it is protected against a security breach. A pro-
cessing protocol of “do not store anything” could then
be seen by large retailers as a radical solution for a “pri-
vacy incorporated” sensing system. If they do not store
any facial image material, the chances of using this
software for identification purposes are significantly di-
minished, and thus the problem of privacy issues seems
to be solved. However, there are two fundamental prob-
lems with this approach.
First, an interactive expression analysis system
needs to keep some local representation of personal
identity over some time for reasonable performance
in interaction (or in temporally integrated reporting)
in order to make sense commercially. This means that
even if the retailer chooses not to store the face image,
the system could still be installed to allow for storing
such data as the vectors of facial expression coordinates
as internal system parameters (van Kuilenburg, Wier-
ing, & den Uyl, 2005; see Figure 7A). Consequently, a Q8
veridical face reconstruction can still be produced and
possibly lead to a given consumer’s identification. For
an example of such possible veridical face reconstruc-
tion, see Figure 7B, where the multilayered superim-
posed 3D mesh on the actor’s face represents the same
facial expression coordinates from Figure 7A. How-
ever, as mentioned earlier, such face reconstruction is
still not possible (Chen et al., 2015), and the face in
Figure 7B is only possible to visualize because the orig-
inal facial image was also recorded and stored. Accord-
ing to the Article 29 Working Party, the original fa-
cial image on Figure 7B would be a source of biometric
data, while Figure 7A would be actual biometric data
(2012).
Importantly, the Article 29 Working Party
recognizes that:
“A template or set of distinctive features used only in
a categorisation system would not, in general, con-
tain sufficient information to identify an individual.
It should only contain sufficient information to per-
form the categorization (e.g., male or female). In this
case it would not be personal data provided the tem-
plate (or the result) is not associated with an individ-
ual’s record, profile or the original image (which will
still be considered personal data)” (Opinion 02/2012
on facial recognition in online and mobile services
(WP 192), p. 4).
Second, personal identity verification can, in the-
ory, be performed on any conceivable record of de-
tailed behavioral observation. In particular, any stored
temporal pattern could be used not only for identity
verification (Jain, Ross, & Prabhakar, 2004), but also
for more relevant, temporal facial expressions pat-
terns, such as the ones in Figure 8 (O’Toole, Roark,
& Abdi, 2002). Therefore, in the future, even if the
data controller chooses not to store the facial image
itself, it could still be possible to reconstruct the iden-
tity from facial expression coordinates, temporal facial
expression patterns, or the combination of both.
CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
On the basis of the analyses above, it is impossible
to use automated facial coding software (the AFRS)
without processing personal data, which forces traders
within the European Union to comply with EU pri-
vacy rules on data protection. The Article 29 Working
Part has already issued an opinion on facial recogni-
tion, claiming that the advent of such technology may
soon make it impossible for consumers to maintain
their anonymity (Article 29 Data Protection Working
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Figure 5. An excerpt from a database of aggregated and anonymized data from facial tracking system in a commercial center in
the Netherlands. PersonID = same ID automatically assigned to each person to anonymize the data; ViewingTime = number of
second the person viewed the screen; Condition = person saw either only an interactive text with advertisements, an interactive
avatar with advertisements or only the advertisements. Neutral-Disgusted = different emotions present in the person’s face.
Printscreen taken by the first author.
Figure 6. Simple retail analytics from an AFRS in a commercial center in the Netherlands for one week in March 2015. Part
A—aggregated data in a visual form. Part B—aggregated data in numerical form; totalPass = number of people that were
detected; nSeenAds = number of people that saw the advertisement, nFinishedAd = number of people that finished watching
all the advertisements; avg viewtime = average viewing time for each of categories. Picture and printscreen taken by the first
author.
Party, 2012). Facial recognition (and to a lesser extent,Q9
emotion recognition) for commercial purposes has been
widely discussed by regulatory bodies around theworld,
including in the U.S. (The Federal Trade Commission,
2012), in the European Union(Article 29 Data Protec-
tion Working Party, 2012), in Canada (Research Group
of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada,
2013), and in Great Britain (Hastings, October 2012).
The authors find that an informed consent by con-
sumers to collection and further processing of personal
data—in particular because of its reliability as a le-
gal basis—plays an important role in lawful use of the
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Figure 7. . (A) Left:—Facial expression and (B) right: identify recognition. Picture and printscreen taken by the first author. Q10
Figure 8. An example of a temporal facial expression pattern. The x-axis shows time interval in seconds, the y-axis shows
intensity and probability of one of the emotions (happy, surprised, neutral) on a scale from 0.0 to 1.0. Different colors indicate
different emotions; see a legend below the x-axis.
AFRS, thus the recommendations of this paper focus on
this element. However, it cannot be ruled out that the
AFRS can be used lawfully based on the balancing test,
provided that the system is not used for identification
and the personal data and the trader (data controller)
apply the above-mentioned measures to limit the im-
pact on the data subjects. However, it is the trader’s
responsibility to comply with the law, which is the rea-
son that the authors recommend informed consent as
the basis for processing personal data; in particular,
because consumers are not likely to be aware of the
existence of and possibilities in these technologies.
With regard to a retailer obtaining consumers’ ex-
plicit informed consent to the operation of the AFRS,
one solution would be the creation of “members only”
stores. There are some shops, such as Macro or Hanos
(in the Netherlands), that already only allow their
members and their invitees to enter the premises.
When registering for a loyalty program, a consumer
could be informed in detail about the AFRS and its
purposes, and be required to consent thereto. The
possibility granted to the members of such shops to
bring invitees with them presents a small problem,
because they would need to sign a similar disclosure.
If that should prove problematic, instead of creating
“members only” shops, a retailer desiring to use the
AFRS could set up a secured entrance to the shop-
ping mall. The retailer would then only grant access
to the store to people having, for instance, watched
a one-minute long video on the AFRS and its pur-
poses, and who have subsequently clicked on the “I
agree” button or otherwise indicated their consent
unambiguously.
Both of these solutions should clearly stipulate that
consumers agree to have their data processed in accor-
dance with the Data Protection Directive (1995). Un-
fortunately, neither of these solutions are easy to im-
plement, and they could discourage the retail stores’
owners from applying the AFRS in practice. However,
it is possible to frame the use of the AFRS as a benefit
for the consumer, who—considering the wide use of so-
cial media, etc.—do not seem concerned about trading
privacy for convenience. Above-mentioned loyalty shops
such as Macro or Hanos are pioneers in the adoption of
this technology and may provide practical examples of
lawful use of the AFRS.
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Because large retailers may be convinced that mak-
ing their shops less accessible could discourage their
patrons from visiting them, they would be more likely
to lobby the legislators and legal enforcement to bemore
flexible with regard to what should be perceived as the
processing of personal data and as an explicit informed
consent. For example, they could claim that if the AFRS
does not allow the storage of consumer data and only
collects information on consumers’ emotion and sociode-
mographic characteristics, the possibility of consumer
identification diminishes and, therefore, the AFRS does
not process personal data. They could also argue that
if the equipment used by the AFRS is separate from
the surveillance equipment, consumers would not eas-
ily confuse it for a security surveillance system and,
therefore, they could just by shopping in a store with
visible AFRS equipment consent to its operation. If one
of the above-mentioned solutions could be applied, es-
pecially in combination with the anonymization and ag-
gregation of consumers’ data, this could provide a good
balance between the need to protect consumer privacy
and allowing retailers to obtain valuable commercial
insights from such data.
THE FUTURE OF THE AFRS IN RETAIL
Today, the AFRS may be used to read consumers’ emo-
tions and predict their decisions. In a colloquial way,
this is likely to be perceived as infringing with con-
sumers’ privacy, since it gives retailers insights into
the consumers’ thoughts and feelings. To the extent the
gathered data allows for identification of consumers, it
should be treated as personal data from a legal perspec-
tive, and the expectation would be for the AFRS to be
in compliance with EU data protection laws.
However, these privacy concerns are only the begin-
ning of issues to be faced in the future. AFRS tech-
nologies will be integrated into single automated sys-
tems, which are capable of remotely and automatically
determining the affective and cognitive states of con-
sumers, based entirely on their upper body posture and
other cues. Below is a list of some existing technolo-
gies that register physiological information about con-
sumers, and which can be combined to move away from
separate channels of input into one complex system in-
terpreting both affective and cognitive states, with low
economic costs involved to run it all together. Such sys-
tems are already in place (e.g., see iMotions, which is
a “biometric platform for eye tracking software, facial
expression analysis, EEG and GSR—all synchronized;”
iMotions, 2015).
By integrating such systems, it will be possible to
remotely gather the following data on physiological
and psychological signals by observing consumers’ up-
per body: (a) facial expressions, such as basic emotions
(Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Lewinski, 2015c), valence
and arousal (Russell, 1980, 2003), specific Facial Ac-
tion Coding System (“FACS”) action units (Ekman &
Rosenberg, 1997); (b) heart rate and variability through
remote PPG (Tasli et al., 2014); (c) eye gaze, num-
ber of eye blinks, head position, and movement (atten-
tion indicator) (see manual of FaceReader, 2015); (d)
respiratory rates (Bartula, Tigges, & Muehlsteff, July
2013); and (e) gesture/body tracking (Bouma et al., Oc-
tober 2013) (used to establish stress levels, interests, or
where the person will go next).
Furthermore, because all these systems are camera
based, it is possible to use them with infrared lights,
which enables the measuring of these signals in total
darkness. Lastly, with more expensive and dedicated
hardware, even more capabilities can be added. For ex-
ample, with regard to eye tracking, if a better measure
of pupil dilation and of the exact position of the con-
sumer’s gaze were introduced, it would offer a higher
accuracy than only the use of camera-based estimations
(Cavanagh, Wiecki, Kochar, & Frank, 2014). Therefore,
an inevitable advancement in number and precision of
biometric measures is looming. In the future, the cru-
cial privacy questions will be which inputs are treated
as personal data and at which point the combination of
inputs will allow for almost unequivocal identification
of individuals.
An interesting paradox that could arise in the near
future would be a switch to tailor-made privacy protec-
tion, pursuant to consumer needs and requests. In order
to observe consumer privacy pursuant to their individ-
ual needs, existing software would need to first gather
data on and to identify a given consumer. Only upon
conducting identification of a consumer, the software
could know the particular consumer’s privacy prefer-
ences. Considering that the coming years are likely
to bring about an increase in high surveillance within
“city” environments, with citizens continuously being
watched from multiple cameras, phones, tablets, and
dedicated surveillance systems, the introduction of de-
sign software allowing the blockage of some of these
images and the disabling of personal data processing
functions can be expected. It would definitely be of in-
terest to consumers if a reliable “I am here incognito”
or “do not track me” protocol could be developed for a
single web-based or multiple-connected person obser-
vation system, similar to incognito or “track the track-
ers” settings in a web browser (Ohana & Shashidhar,
2013). However, in order for such different subsystems
to respect consumers’ privacy preferences, these sys-
tems will have to agree on a consumer’s local identity
in someway. Amachine decision-making patternmight
go something like this: “Is this another image of X who
did not want to be recorded?”; “It is impossible to deter-
mine, all reference materials on X were just deleted.”
The Article 29 Working Party recognizes this issue
and understands that a retailer (i.e., a data controller)
could actually perform such identification to establish
if a customer has provided informed consent or not:
“[ . . . ] the data controller may [ . . . ] assess whether
a user has provided consent or not as a legal ba-
sis for the processing. This initial processing (i.e.
image acquisition, face detection, comparison, etc)
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may in that case have a separate legal basis, no-
tably the legitimate interest of the data controller to
comply with data protection rules. Data processed
during these stages should only be used for the
strictly limited purpose to verify the user’s consent
and should therefore be deleted immediately after”
(Opinion 02/2012 on facial recognition in online and
mobile services (WP 192), p.5).
From 25 May 2018 the newly adopted General Data
Protection Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of 27
April 2016) will enter into force. This data protection
reform will strengthen data protection, which entails
that the analyses and conclusions presented in this pa-
per will still be applicable. The reform entails stronger
(more centralized) enforcement and substantial admin-
istrative fines of up to EUR 20,000,000, or in the case of
an undertaking, up to 4 % of the total worldwide annual
turnover of the preceding financial year (whichever is
higher, see Article 83). The principles of importance for
the present analyses concerning purpose, data quality,
justification, and consent are largely unaltered by these
new developments. However, the Regulation contains
more detailed requirements concerning consent (Article
7), alongwith revised provisions on profiling (Article 22)
combined with particular rules on biometric data. Bio-
metric data includes “data resulting from specific tech-
nical processing relating to the physical, physiological
or behavioral characteristics of a natural person, which
allow or confirm the unique identification of that natu-
ral person, such as facial images [ . . . ],” which are cate-
gorized as sensitive data (Article 9) that in this context
requires consent for processing to be lawful. Thus, the
recommendation of the researchers to acquire consent
is only further emphasized. In addition, the regulation
requires the trader to carry out an assessment of the
impact of the envisaged processing operations prior to
the processing (“impact assessment”, see Article 35).
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